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PREFACE 
My study for this thesis was begun over two years ago when I 
became interested in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, especially his 
Critique of Pure Reason. I decided then to attempt an in-depth study 
of his Critique in order to prepare a text for college students in 
composition courses. It was to be a text designed to help students 
come to terms with some of the more perplexing problems of man's 
intellectual life by providing them with the means for understanding 
the structure of thought. 
As it stands now, though, this is a prolegomen to that text. 
It contains the essential theory for the text, but lacks sufficient 
examples to make it readily accessible to the student, and it lacks the 
exercises needed to give them a thorough understanding of how its 
content can be applied to the routine problems of writing. 
This is not a prolegomenon to a text for writers in the usual 
sense. It is not a study of styles of writing or grammar. It is a 
heuristic designed to aid the student in discovering meaning in what he 
has written and in all that he will write. It is a formal study of 
the formal structure of language and the epistemology of thought. It 
is intended for the student interested in exploring the full potential 
for his intellectual growth and development through writing. 
Basically, I wanted to simplify Kant's work without reducing it 
to an absurdity and without simply popularizing it. I wanted to write 
a text incorporating the best Kant has to offer, and write it so that 
most students in composition could understand his work. 
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My interpretation of Kant's Critique has colored my presen-
tation. Many interpretations are possible, but mine is based on the 
premise that his Critique is actually the foundation for what is now 
known as set theory, the theory of classes or sets. Set theory is now 
the basis of modern mathematics and logic. It seems to me that it 
should also be the foundation of a theory of writing. 
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This text is not extensively footnoted, for most of it is 
Kantian. I cannot, at this time, sort out my ideas from his; his ideas 
seem to have become mine. I am also indebted to Ernst Cassirer's 
profound study, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, although I do not 
draw on it directly. For a basic understanding of set theory, I am 
indebted to Hans Reichenbach's Elements of Symbolic Logic. In order to 
avoid any major contradictions in logic, I consulted Irving M. Copi's 
Introduction to Logic. Other references used in writing this are 
contained in the bibliography. 
I am indebted to the members of my thesis committee for having 
made the writing of this thesis a genuine learning experience. Each 
member contributed a unique quality to my experience. John M. Herum 
contributed his understanding of problems of organization and editing. 
Dr. Bruce E. Teets contributed his understanding of the aesthetic 
problems involved. 
To Dr. Donald W. Cummings, I am especially indebted for 
encouraging me to undertake my study of Kant, for being available for 
many hours of invaluable discussion on the various problems I 
encountered, and for his actual help in preparing this manuscript. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental function of language is to express relations. 
Language that does not express relations is mere babbling. The 
relations a writer can develop are (1) ones in which he stands in 
some sort of relation to things and people, (2) ones in which people 
stand in some sort of relation to things and other people, or (3) ones 
in which things stand in relation to other things and to people. The 
writer can choose not to include himself in any relation he creates, 
but, as will be noted later even if he does not, he is still the 
intellectual center of that universe, 
Relations 
Organization, unit and coherence characterize writing that has 
well established relations between things and people. They charac-
terize the rational order upon which man depends so much. Every 
investigation man undertakes is begun with the assumptions that 
underlying the thing he is investigating is some kind of unity, that 
things cohere, and that they can be organized into patterns to which 
he can relate. Since writing is a form of investigation, writing 
that does not have organization, unity and coherence contradicts 
man's basic intellectual assumptions. 
The writer can come to know and understand the relations 
expressed through language either through introspection or through 
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the study of how other men have come to know and understand the way 
their minds work. To know and understand relations through intro-
spection is to have the mind reflect upon itself. The study of how 
other men have come to know and understand the way their minds work is 
the study of logic. 
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When a writer is introspective, he contemplates the structure 
of his mind, and attempts to discover the characteristics of his 
thinking that are uniquely his own, as opposed to those characteristics 
he has in common with all other men. He determines the characteristics 
of how other men think by a careful study of what they have said and 
written. The mind must look within itself for the relations that 
underlie the language it uses to express itself. 
To introspect effectively is difficult, for the relations for 
which the mind searches are hidden under a mass of symbols and meanings 
that are in a constant state of change. They are constantly shifting 
and evolving. But it is necessary for the writer, if his writing is 
to have unity, to be the most introspective of people. Introspection 
is, however, much more effective when aided by an understanding of 
logic. 
Formal logic is the study of the basic relations common to the 
thinking of all men. It is an ancient study which has sought to 
isolate a constant, a universal--something common to the thinking of 
all men in all places for all times. In the Western world, logic has 
been revised, updated and expanded with greater and greater precision 
since the time of Aristotle. And, to the satisfaction of the logician, 
those relations that have been isolated have been found to be as 
universal as they could want. 
This is why logic is so important to the writer. By comple-
menting his own introspection with a study of logic, he can compare 
his insight into the workings of his own .mind with the accumulated 
understanding of many men. He should, however, be aware that logic 
has not isolated all relations expressed through language. In fact, 
logic accounts for only a small part of the total complex that 
represents the ultimate capacity of the mind for creating relations. 
Much remains for the writer to discover, especially about the capacity 
of his own mind and its uniqueness. 
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The major shortcoming of logic for the writer is the result of 
a limitation the logician places on his study: all the relations he 
isolates must be isolated with scientific certainty; he is interested 
only in valid relations, which may or may not be the meaningful 
relations the writer will wish to use. The "language" of the logician 
is precise and embodies a degree of certainty not usually found in 
some other realms of human experience. There is no room for ambiguity 
in the "language" he uses to express the relations he discovers. 
But, whereas the logician might seem to err in attempting to 
be too restrictive in achieving the degree of certainty he desires, 
the writer most certainly errs in failing to understand and acknowledge 
the importance of the relations the logician wishes to express. At 
best, logic provides man with negative criteria for the use of his 
mind. It can help man avoid meaninglessness in the midst of ambiguity. 
Logic is a skeptical science, but it probably has good reason for 
being so. 
The writer who does not come to understand how relations are 
expressed through language, either through his own experiences as a 
writer or through a study of logic, will never find writing a source 
of satisfaction. He will find it, on the contrary, to be a source of 
frustration. He will never be completely free from frustration, even 
if he does understand how relations are expressed through language, 
but he can expect to find enough satisfaction to justify his work if 
he does. 
Since this proposed text is devoted to the study of how 
relations are expressed through language, it is devoted to the study 
of a kind of logic. It is not devoted to the formal logic taught in 
philosophy, but to the logic of rhetoric. It has much in common with 
formal logic, but it is designed specifically for the requirements of 
the writer. Because it is a logic, it attempts to isolate relations 
with the same degree of scientific certainty claimed by the logician 
in his study, but it acknowledges the problem of content, a problem 
generally ignored by the logician, though important to the writer. 
Molecular Structure of Meaning 
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The relations that are possible to express through the use of 
language are dependent upon a fixed set of intellectual mechanisms. 
Traditional grammar attempts to isolate these mechanisms by defining 
the parts of speech and the way in which they can or cannot be combined 
into units of meaning. Within that grammar, a simple sentence, 
consisting of a subject (usually, a noun) and a predicate (a verb and 
a direct object), is a sort of basic unit of meaning, because it 
expresses the existence of a relation between the subject and the 
predicate. 
Traditional grammar, however, with its definition of a sentence, 
has isolated the mechanisms used to express thought through language in 
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a way that stresses the linear, inflexible dimension of relations. It 
does so at the expense of the greater, more flexible, spatial dimension 
of those relations. Adherence to that definition creates the impression 
that relations are one dimensional and inflexible, which obscures 
language's full potential for expression and meaning. Adherence to it 
tends to create thinking in its own image, often forcing those who 
adhere to it into a simplistic and stereotyped mode of thinking. 
At its best, the traditional definition of a sentence emphasizes 
action and movement in writing. It is widely used to create modern, 
popular fiction that emphasizes the fast moving plot line, as found in 
most detective and science fiction novels, and as found in most of the 
novels that work their way into the best seller list. Its main 
liability to the novelist is that the characters in such novels are 
stereotyped and the events are one dimensional. 
But the human intellect is molecular and spatial, rather than 
linear, in its most profound and meaningful moments. It does not 
deal with simple, distinct, one dimensional, stereotyped units of 
meaning. In its most profound moments, when it is philosophic, 
aesthetic or scientific, the human mind creates molecular relations. 
The speculative and inquiring mind is intent upon exploring the 
multitude of possibilities within a given unit of meaning, and cannot 
do this with only a linear dimension to relations at its disposal. 
The traditional definition of a sentence cannot begin to account for 
the complexity of the relations language can express. 
Much literary criticism, for example, is devoted to exploring 
the molecular structure of the greater works of literature. According 
to Joseph Frank, in his well known essay "Spatial Form in Modern 
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Literature," the most significant modern literature "is moving in the 
direction of spatial form. 111 Such writers as T. S. Eliot and Ezra 
Pound create images that "present an intellectual and emotional complex 
simultaneously. 11 2 This a linear definition of a sentence cannot 
account for. According to Frank, it is "necessary to undermine the 
inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating," thereby, "the 
reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive 
the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling 
in time. 113 
The profundity of human thinking and the ability of the mind 
to create complex relations is spatial also, and the only way to fully 
appreciate it is to undermine the "inherent consecutiveness of 
language." The traditional definition of a sentence provides no 
understanding of how this can be accomplished. 
The traditional sentence emphasizes the linear dimension of 
language by reducing the relation between a subject and a predicate 
to a simple subject/predicate relation. On the most simplistic level 
possible within the traditional definition, the sentence is a mechanism 
that contains a predicate that "says something" about the subject. 4 
To "say something," the predicate must state the occurrence or 
existence of something. The following are some examples: 
The sun shines. 
Men hope. 
The trees are green. 5 
The relation between the subjects of these "sentences" and their 
predicates is li,near, because nothing more than a one dimensional 
relation is emphasized by the definition of a sentence. The sun 
either does or does not shine, just as men either hope or do not 
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hope, and just as trees are either green or they are not green. 
The traditional definition of a "sentence" is inadequate 
because it can be used to identify linguistic expressions that condense 
complex units of meaning into oversimplified relations, as in the 
relation between "Men hope." The predicate "hope" of this expression 
"says something," but much more than is immediately obvious through 
the definition of a sentence as consisting of a subject and a 
predicate. For now, it is enough to point out that it obscures the 
relation existing between "men" and their "existence" and the nature 
of their existence in that expression. Man's ability to hope is but 
one of the many features by which his existence is known, and the 
relation between that feature and the other features of his existence 
is obscured by the traditional definition. 
The definition also obscures the implication that men must 
"exist" if they are to hope, and that all men that "exist" must hope, 
which may or may not be the case. Some men do, and some men do not. 
A molecular definition of a unit of meaning, a sentence, would be able 
to account for this possibility, just as it would be able to account 
for the fact that hope is a unique feature to man's existence as 
opposed to the existence, for instance, of other animals. 
A whole composition from a short piece of expository prose to 
a book comprised of many volumes, is nothing more than the ampli-
fication of the meaning contained in a sentence. No matter how 
simple or complex a composition may be, its basic meaning can be 
reduced to a sentence, if there is any meaningful degree of unity, 
coherence or organization with it. The expression, "Men hope," could 
be the basic unit of meaning from which a writer could create volumes 
of writing. In fact, volumes of writing do exist on the subject of 
men and their hopes. But poorly written compositions of any length 
will obscure the relation between a sentence, its basic unit of 
meaning and the composition as a whole, and this the traditional 
definition of a sentence cannot account for. 
To characterize its function as a unit of meaning, as a 
mechanism for creating meaning, a sentence should be thought of as a 
molecule of meaning, comparable to a molecule of matter. It is, in 
this sense, a molecule of intellectual matter. It is a relatively 
stable configuration of intellectual matter, perhaps the most stable 
that man has to work with. 
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By thinking of the sentence as a molecule of meaning, it is 
possible to think of a composition as composed of molecules of meaning 
added to other molecules to create larger and larger units of meaning. 
Or, within a composition, a molecule of meaning may be broken down 
into an atomic unit, and atomic units can be broken down into sub-
atomic and sub-sub-atomic units, ad infinitum. This occurs because 
the mind creates relations on levels of specificity or generality. 
The smaller the unit of meaning, the more specific it will be, just 
as it will be more general the larger it becomes. 
In this sense, writing a composition on a complex subject 
requires an intellectual reaction comparable to breaking down a 
molecule of matter into its atomic and sub-atomic parts. The further 
the process is carried within a composition, the more unstable becomes 
the material with which the writer is working. The more unstable the 
material, the more difficult the process of writing becomes. 
A composition may be written on any unit of meaning, no matter 
what its level of specificity or generality. If the subject matter is 
well defined and quite specific, then it is probably . an atomic or 
sub-atomic unit of meaning. If it is broad and general, then it is 
probably a molecule of meaning. The only term available for charac-
terizing units of meaning larger and more general than a molecule is 
"thing." 
The problems of dealing with "things of meaning" will be 
discussed later. For now, it is enough to understand that only when 
"things" are material things can their level of specificity or 
generality be accurately determined. Only when the existence of 
things can be verified through the use of one or more of the five 
senses, can things be identified as "things of meaning" as opposed to 
molecules of meaning. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE SYSTEM 
The writer writes to create a known. He writes because he 
wants to bring some order into the disorder he finds when he looks 
into the unknown. The unknown is disorder and chaos, things in a 
constant state of flux. The difference between something known and 
something unknown becomes the difference between a complete and 
incomplete system. 
The Infinite Universe of Things 
The writer is at the center of an infinite universe of things. 
It is his universe of discourse. It is a universe of material and 
non-material things, a universe of things known and unknown. If there 
is one, unique function of man's reason it is to make sense of that 
universe. The writer's universe of discourse can make sense to him 
and to those for whom he writes only by constructing systems from 
those relations. It is in this way and this way only that things 
unknown can become known, and things known can become better known. 
A thing for a writer may be a material thing, an object, a 
part of the physical universe man experiences through the use of one or 
more of his five senses. A material thing about which he might write 
may be the smallest unit of matter known to man (it would then be a 
"small" thing), or it may be the whole earth (it would then be a "big" 
thing), or it may be a thing as large as a galaxy or the very universe 
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to which the galaxy belongs (it would then be a "very big" thing). 
From the study of the atom to the study of the universe and all things 
in between--each is a thing in the infinite universe of things and 
potentially a subject for a writer. 
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But the writer does not write about material things only. In 
fact, many writers seldom write about them directly, choosing instead 
to write about them as elements in circumstances, as states of affairs, 
as an element in an action, an event, a deed, or some aim or objective. 
A war, for inst;ance, might be a ''big" thing and, perhaps, a "bad" 
thing in which any number of material things are involved. An accident 
might be an "unfortunate" thing in which many things are involved. A 
promotion in a job might well be a "profitable" thing, whereas a 
college education, a student might hope, would be a "useful" thing. 
A non-material thing for which a writer might find relations 
may be a thought, an abstract idea or some difficult concept such as 
space or time, justice, love, hate, beauty, honor or truth. Thoughts 
are "things" that may deal with things that do not exist, things which 
might only possibly exist, things such as Hobbits, unicorns or elves. 
The universe of things material and non-material is also the 
universe of things known and unknown. For the writer, things unknown 
must become known, and things known must become better known. Things 
unknown are things for which man has constructed no systems. Things 
known can become better known by constructing better systems, for 
things known are only apparently known. The fundamental faith of the 
scientist is that there is always more to know about anything in the 
material, concrete, physical universe--from the constitution of the 
atom to the infinitely expandable universe. The fundamental faith of 
the writer is that there is always more to know about everything--
whether of or beyond the physical universe. 
The writer should understand, therefore, what it means to 
"know" a thing, the difference between a thing known and a thing 
unknown, and why things known can always become better known. 
Knowledge of the known and unknown is knowledge of systems and how 
things relate within systems. The study .of writing becomes, then, 
the study of systems. 
The Whole and Its Parts 
The principles for constructing systems are many and complex, 
but, at the very least, a system is a "whole" thing constituted of 
"parts," such that each part must contribute to the whole and stand 
in some sort of relation to it, and such that the whole must stand 
in some sort of relation to each and every part. The whole exists 
for the parts, and the parts exist for the whole. The integrity of 
any system must be such that, theoretically, the absence of any part 
of the whole or the addition to the whole of any superfluous part 
would immediately be detected by any critical, intelligent audience. 
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It is comparable to a picture puzzle. If one piece of the 
puzzle is missing, its absence should be immediately detected, and no 
additional pieces can be added to it without distorting the "whole" 
picture on the puzzle. The integrity of any composition must be 
maintained so that the absence of any essential part or the addition of 
any superfluous part would immediately be detected by any critical 
reader. 
The infinite variety of things does not prevent man from 
assuming that behind that variety there is some sort of unity. In 
fact, man must assume that there is unity or the totality of his 
experience would be meaningless. Unity is itself only an idea. It 
is not a fact, for neither the existence nor non-existence of unity 
can be proved. No one can point to it, hear it, smell it, taste it, 
or touch it, but it is as essential to human existence as anything 
the existence of which can be demonstrated. Without it, all else 
would be meaningless. Unity .is a necessary .idea. 
Things--all things material and non-material--"make sense" 
to man only when they constitute a system, because it is only when 
they constitute a system or a meaningful part of a system that they 
can begin to satisfy man's intellectual need for unity. Man's 
intellectual life, especially the intellectual life of the writer, 
is dedicated to the end that completeness and the unconditional can 
be found. He is motivated in his search by his desire for unity. 
The main function of systems is to create unity from the 
diversity of the physical universe, but they can also be used for 
other purposes. When used to create unity within diversity, they are 
"useful" in that they serve a specific end in man's intellectual life. 
But they can also be used for purely speculative functions, wherein 
their usefulness is questionable. 
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Because man's knowledge of the physical universe is irrational, 
his intellectual needs are never completely satisfied. To begin to 
satisfy those needs it is necessary for him to speculate on possi-
bilities, and the actuality becomes pale in comparison. He creates 
systems out of things that may or may not exist or ever exist. He 
creates systems for things that may only possibly exist. Such 
systems are meaningful, but in a way different from the way in which 
systems of representations are meaningful. 
Man can, for instance, create a system of elves, even though 
no elves have ever been experienced. They may or may not exist. They 
may never exist, but that does not prevent man from conceiving of 
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the possibility of their existence. The mind is programmed in such a 
way that man can create a system of knowledge about elves by creating 
classes to which they would belong if they did exist. Classes and sub-
classes of elves could be created to include big elves, little elves, 
kind elves, evil elves, meek elves, prideful elves, wealthy elves, 
and poor elves, strong elves, weak elves, etc. 
But, because of the characteristic of the mind that allows 
man to create such systems, even though no elves have ever been seen, 
the possibility that they do exist must remain open. And since that 
possibility must remain open, the possibility that elves are man-like 
must remain open. If it is possible for man to think of it, it is 
possible that it may exist. Or it is possible that it may exist, but 
be different from the way in which man conceives of it. 
There may, for instance, be a better way to organize the 
universe of plants and animals, but thus far the scientists have found 
none more satisfying than the organization which the theory of 
evolution provides them. It is flexible enough to allow, even, a 
place for elves on the scale of evolution. Controlling ideas survive 
if and only if they provide man with an understanding of the actual 
and the possible. 
And, as with the construction of any system, the construction 
of a system of elves would hav~ to be governed by some controlling 
idea, since no elves have even been seen. The controlling idea used 
to construct the system of elves above is anthropomorphic. The 
characteristics of humans were imposed on elves. They could just as 
well be fish-like, or plant-like as man-like, but elves have tradi-
tionally been thought of as man-like. 
Within any system, things are related to a whole through a 
single principle, a controlling idea. The universal controlling idea 
is that a whole, though indeterminant, always preceeds the discovery 
of any part of that whole, and that the whole will determine the 
relation between any two or more parts. For all intents and purposes, 
this controlling idea is a supposition. It is hypothetical and 
problematic. It can only establish the possibility of unity in the 
midst of diversity. Its primary function in man's intellectual life 
is to motivate and regulate it. It is an effective motivative and 
regulative agent only when and if man becomes aware of the limitations 
of his reason. 
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A picture puzzle, for example, is controlled by the "picture" 
on the puzzle. The manner in which each piece fits together is 
governed by that picture and the system through which it is constructed. 
The pieces of a puzzle are not random. Each has a place in the whole 
of the puzzle and stands in some sort of relation to every other piece. 
The manner in which each piece of the puzzle is cut is incidental to 
the overall picture they compose. 
Since there must be a controlling idea if a system is to be 
constructed, man is placed in the center of the universe of things. 
All things, therefore, exist--if they exist at all--in relation to 
man. This view is simple enough, but still deceptive. It is constantly 
being subjected to philosophical disputes because of its implications: 
if each thing in the universe must stand in relation to man if it is 
to "exist," then man is the center of all systems and, therefore, the 
center of the universe. This view puts man in an egocentric position, 
which many reject as philosophically and theologically invalid. Such 
a view does, however, provide the writer with valuable insight into 
the task he faces as a writer, and it is epistemologically valid. 
If man could not construct systems, and if those systems were 
constructed without controlling ideas, the mind of man would be no 
more than a tablet upon which things simply write their existence. 
16 
The mind would be a passive recipient of all that goes on outside the 
mind. To be an active agent, the mind must have some sort of mechanism 
with which to act. That mechanism is the one that allows man to 
formulate controlling ideas and systems that relate and make sense of 
the things in his universe--the material and non-material, the known 
and the unknown. 
Man's search for the complete picture, for unity, the complete 
and the unconditional·, however, functions in his intellectual life like 
the carrot dangled in front of an ass to make him move. The only 
major difference between man and the ass in this respect is that man 
knows, or should know, that he will never get his carrot. But it 
leads him to make the unknown known, and the known better known. His 
desire for the carrot of complete knowledge of all things material and 
non-material leads him on in his search, even though the carrot always 
seems to be just out of reach. It is his motivation. It is his opiate; 
and is so strong that he continues in spite of what may be the 
hopelessness of finding it. But it serves him well in his search 
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for intellectual, psychological and physical well being. 
The desire for unity--the complete and unconditional--contributes 
to his way of life by allowing him to do two important things. First, 
it allows him to create systems, systems within which he can regulate 
the things that make up the material world and his experiences within 
that world, including the experiences of others with whom he comes into 
contact. Second, it allows him to create and regulate the possible 
existence of other things and experiences. Because he can create and 
regulate his and other's experiences and possible things and experiences, 
he remains the center of the universe. 
Thing as Prototype 
Man's understanding of what it means to "know" a thing comes 
from his understanding of what it means to know what he thinks of as a 
material, concrete, physical thing--anything man has or can ever 
experience through the use of his five physical senses--his sight, 
hearing, taste, touch and smell. The relation between a material thing 
and its attributes is the prototype of all relations and systems of 
knowledge. Man's knowledge of what he thinks of as material things is 
the foundation of his knowledge of all things, material and non-material. 
The difference between a material thing that is known and one 
that is unknown is the difference between a material thing as man 
experiences it through his five senses and a material thing as he 
thinks he should be able to experience it. A thing as man thinks he 
should be able to experience it may or may not exist. The disparity 
between his experience and his thought creates the irrational state of 
man's knowledge of all things. 
Man's knowledge is irrational, 6 because there is always a 
disparity between what he knows and what he thinks he should be able 
to know, and between what he experiences and what he thinks he should 
be able to experience. For his knowledge to be totally rational, 
what he knows and experiences should be the same as what he thinks he 
should be able to know and experience. 
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The mind of man is not a passive recipient of sense impressions, 
not a blank tablet upon which the physical universe is recorded. It 
is an active, creative agent. It receives data from the physical 
world in the form of sense data, but the mind then processes that 
data to give it meaning. 
The mind processes data according to its program. The program 
imposes conditions on the data it is receiving. One of those conditions 
is that things must have distinctive features that man can experience 
with one or more of his five senses. Features of things furnish the 
mind's program with the data it needs to function. A thing could 
have features that man could not experience with his five senses, but 
he will never experience it, because his mind is not programmed to 
receive the data they must transmit. Man now knows that there are 
things capable of transmitting data to which his basic five senses 
cannot respond without the aid of scientific instruments. There are, 
for instance, light rays beyond the visible spectrum, sounds beyond 
man's auditory capacity, and textures beyond man's tactile threshold. 
But this does not change the basic observation. In fact, it 
only tends to confirm it, because the instruments man has been able 
to invent for this purpose are simply extensions of his basic five 
senses. They simply make data available to man that is beyond the 
immediate range of those basic senses. 
Beyond even the range of the five senses with the aid of 
scientific instruments, there is still another realm of experience. 
It is the realm of possibilities. It is the realm of things that 
could possibly exist, even though no man has ever experienced them. 
It is, for example, possibly that there are light rays, sounds and 
textures beyond those man can now experience even though the use of 
his most sophisticated instruments. No one may ever discover a way 
to experience them, but the possibility that they exist must always 
remain open, until it is proven that they do not exist. They may 
emanate from things man already knows, but then again they may emanate 
from something of which man has no knowledge, from something man has 
never experienced in any way. 
The realm of possibilities is immense--infinite, for all 
intents and purposes. But, because the mind and the five senses 
dictate the conditions under which a thing can "exist," no thing can 
exist for man that is not a source of sense data. The mind can 
function at times without a direct source of sense data, but never 
when it is experiencing a thing. In this respect, the mind is 
comparable to a computer programmed to process a certain kind of data. 
Without that data, it cannot function. Its potential for functioning 
is there, but that potential will be of little or no value without 
the data it requires. 
Things and Representations 
It is true that a thing has certain features that furnish the 
mind's program with the data it needs to function, but in order to 
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account for the irrational nature of man's thought, it is necessary 
to assume that what man experiences as a thing is not a thing, but 
something else. It is also necessary to assume that the features of 
whatever it is he experiences are not the features of a thing itself, 
but are, instead, the features of something else. 
Whatever knowledge man has of what he assumes are things 
comes, though, from the sense data that fills his mind. To understand 
how it is that man assumes the existence of a thing from the presence 
of this sense data, it is necessary to understand the nature of the 
sensory experience. 
Sensory Experience 
The relation between a complete and partial sensory experience 
of what man thinks of as a thing is illustrated in the following 
diagrams. Diagram 1 shows a model of what man thinks of as a thing, 
divided into slices. Each slice stands for a basic kind of sense 
data man receives from it. One slice is devoted to visual data, one 
to textural, one to sound, one to smell, and another to taste. To 
experience that which the model represents through all of the sense 
data it can provide would be to have a complete sensory experience of 
it. 
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Diagram 2, though, presents the same model, but without the 
visual data, the sense data necessary for man to see it. A man could 
still experience it without this data, but his experience of it would 
not be as complete as it would be if he could see it. A man can still 
feel, hear, taste and smell what he thinks of as things, even though he 
cannot see them. Sight simply offers an additional dimension to the 
total sensory experience. 
Thing 
Diagram 1 
Relation Between Thing 
and Sources of Sense Data 
21 
Thing 
Diagram 2 
Relation Between Thing 
and Sources of Sense Data 
Without Visibility 
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Diagrams 3 through 6 again present the same model, but missing 
from each is another feature that furnishes man with sense data. In 
Diagram 3, man's experience of what he thinks of as a thing is missing 
textural data, so that he cannot touch or feel it. Diagram 4 shows 
the model without sound data in addition to visual and textural data. 
Diagram 5 shows it without smell data, so that the only way man can 
experience it at this point is through the one feature that remains, 
that is, through its taste. It can still be experienced, but not as 
completely as it could up to this point. 
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Diagram 6 presents the model of what man thinks of as a thing 
without any means of transmitting sensory data, and represents a 
totally incomplete experience of it. Such an experience is, however, 
only theoretically possible, simply because it does not furnish man 
with any sensory data. It is also possible that it could be trans-
mitting data to which none of the five senses can respond, as mentioned 
before. Such a thing may exist, but, because of the way in which man 
thinks of things, it does not for all intents and purposes, except as a 
possibility. Until man finds some way to experience it as a sensory 
reality--through, for instance, the use of scientific instruments--it 
does not exist. 
The closest man can come to understanding what he thinks of as 
a thing is represented in Diagram 7 in model A. It is the same model 
derived from the process of analysis carried on in Diagrams 1 through 6. 
It is the same model used in Diagram 6 without the differentiated 
features. The model in Diagram 7 represents what man thinks of as a 
thing as potential knowledge, infinitely potential knowledge. It is the 
realm beyond the five senses. It is the realm of possibilities. 
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and Sources of Sense Data 
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Model Bin Diagram 7, however, is a presentation of man's 
actual knowledge of what he thinks of as a thing. It is the same 
model used in Diagram 1. It was necessary to go through the process 
of abstracting each of its features in Diagrams 2 through 6 to show 
that underlying it is the realm of possibilities. It is a mistake for 
man to assume that what he can experience is all there is to experience, 
and the only way to show it was through those diagrams. Model A in 
Diagram 7 shows a thing as it might possibly be. Model B shows the 
same thing as man experiences it, and is known as a representation. 
See Diagram 8 for a further demonstration of this relation. 
But, whether or not a thing exists is actually immaterial as 
well as indeterminant. All that man knows about whatever it is he 
experiences is what he receives from the sense data it transmits. In 
the absence of such data, he must assume that it does not exist, unless 
he is to assume that it exists as a possibility. Since man can think 
it possible to experience more than his senses will allow him to 
experience, his conclusion must always be that his experience is 
partial and incomplete. This possibility is important to the human 
mind because it sends him in search of more and more information in an 
attempt to fill the gap between what he thinks and what he experiences. 
It becomes his probe into the unknown. 
Man does not, therefore, experience a thing. He actually 
experiences the sensory data transmitted by a thing that may or may 
not exist. This sensory data becomes a system of sense impressions 
in the mind once it has been processed by the mind. This system of 
sense impressions is called a representation. The possibility that a 
thing may exist can only be inferred from its representation. But, 
Representation 
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Thing 
(Model B) 
Diagram 7 
Relation Between Thing 
and Representation 
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even then, there is nothing more than the theoretical possibility of 
its existence, since there is nothing in the constitution of a 
representation that can be used to confirm or, for that matter, deny 
its existence. 
For an understanding of the physical universe in which he 
lives, man does not study things, for, as has been established, they 
may or may not exist. He studies, instead, representations, because 
they are his only direct source of knowledge about that universe. Man 
does not learn more about things, but about representation by studying 
their nature and constitution. Man studies the attributes that 
constitute the representations to know its nature and constitution. 
Features and Attributes 
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Just as it is possible to distinguish between a thing and a 
representation, it is also possible to distinguish between the features 
of the thing and the attributes of a representation. Things as man 
knows them have features. Representations have attributes. Things, 
if they exist, exist outside the mind. To the extent that representa-
tions exist, they exist inside the mind. Features exist in the sensory 
realm of man's total experience as a sort of mediator between the 
outer realm of possibility and the inner realm of concrete experience. 
The first is the realm of things, the second is the realm of represen-
tations. 
Like representations, attributes of representations exist 
inside the mind. They are the abstractions of man's sensory experience. 
Like representations, attributes are inside the mind, but 
representations are in the realm of concrete experience, and attributes 
are in the realm of abstract experience. 
Thus, things, if they exist, exist outside the mind in the 
realm of possibility. Features of things exist in the mediate realm 
of the sensory. Representations are created by the mind partially on 
the basis of the features and exist within the realm of concrete 
experience. Attributes are created by the mind partially on the basis 
of the representations, and exist within the realm of abstract 
experience. 
Principle of Identification 
An unknown thing becomes known only through man's knowledge of 
the relation between the representation and its attributes. A thing 
becomes better known by knowing more of the attributes of which the 
representation is constituted, and more about those attributes. 
Knowledge of the thing itself--complete and unconditional knowledge of 
thing--is impossible, for it is theoretically possible to know much 
more about a thing than man can know from its attributes. 
As demonstrated in Diagrams 6 and 7, that which can be known 
about a thing does not begin to account for all that is possible to 
know about it. Complete knowledge of a thing would be, were it 
possible, a complete system of all the attributes a thing has or could 
ever have. At best, a representation is always an incomplete system. 
The relation between a representation and its attributes is 
similar to the relation between the ratio of the circumference of a 
circle and its diameter than it is to the relation of identification. 
The ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is known as 
pi (11'), and is an irrational number approximately equal to 3.14159. 
32 
It is an irrational number because it can never become a "whole" number, 
even though it is carried · an infinite number of places beyond the decimal 
point. Because pi can never become a whole number, it can never be 
completely known, just as a representation can never be completely 
known. Both can always become better known. 
If there were no disparity between things as man experiences 
them and things as man thinks he should be able to experience them, 
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his experience would follow the principle of identification. Under 
this principle, his experience would be the same as what he thinks it 
should be. But the possibility that this can occur is only theoretical 
and can be demonstrated only through the use of some system of 
symbolism, as, for example, in the following equation: X = f. In 
this equation, the "X" stands for the idea of a whole thing, a complete 
sensual experience of a thing as man thinks he should be able to 
experience it. And "f" stands for the features by which the thing 
will be known, under the principle of identification. The following 
table demonstrates the relation between "X" and "f" under this 
principle: 
Attributes Thing 
f X 
False False 
True True 
This table demonstrates that "X" is not an unknown that will become 
better known, but an unknown that will become completely known when 
"f" is known. It demonstrates that "X" has the same truth value as 
"f." Whatever is said of "f" must be true of "X" and if "f" is false, 
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then "X" is false. If "f" is true, then "X" must be true. No other 
valid relation can exist between them. 
No other relation can exist between them because "f" constitutes 
a complete system, the complete system by which "X" is known and 
identified. If it were otherwise, the mind would immediately respond 
to the absence of data, i.e., "f" would be less than "X." And, if 
anything were added to "f," then "X" would be less than "f," which 
would mean that the relation between them would be distorted. 
The relation between "X" and "f" above is a misrepresentation 
of the relation between a thing and its features because it constitutes 
a complete system. Man has never experienced one thing--not one in the 
infinite universe of things--in this way. A perfect, complete system 
of identification can only occur abstractly, never in the world of 
material things and man's experience of them. 
The equation above represents the relation between a thing and 
its features that man thinks he should be able to experience. The 
actual identification of a material thing as man experiences it is 
invariably based on an incomplete system of attributes. Those 
attributes constitute a system of knowledge that provides man with a 
representation of one thing that might possibly exist, not with the 
thing itself. Thus a thing is always identified by a mere represen-
tation of its possible existence. 
The Copula 
The relation between a thing and its features can be demon-
strated through the principle of identification only because of the 
imprecision of the mechanism used to establish the relation. The 
mechanism that does this is the copula. 
The principle of disparity actually governs man's knowledge of 
things. This principle governs the manner in which man receives sense 
data and the way in which those sense data are programmed by the mind 
into meaningful relations. Those relations become part of a system in 
which all the sense data received from a thing are related to the idea 
of a whole thing. The system by which the thing will be known is 
complete or incomplete to the extent to which the sense data derived 
from the features of the thing are complete or incomplete. 
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The system of features by which a thing is "known," however, is 
always incomplete when it stands in relation to the idea of the whole 
thing. This is the principle of disparity. As a result, knowledge of 
a thing is actually the knowledge of a representation of the thing, or 
the knowledge of an incomplete system of attributes. 
Because a representation is an incomplete system of attributes, 
each of its attributes is a part of the idea of a whole representation. 
The only intellectual mechanism man has to establish the relation 
between a part of a representation and the idea of a whole representation 
is the copula. In mathematics, the science of the ideal and abstract, 
the copula is the equal sign (=). It is used to establish the relation 
between an unknown, some "X" factor, and its solution. In the equation-
e == mc 2, for instance, Einstein was solving for the unknown "e" which 
stands for "energy." Energy stands in relation to "mc 211 so that the 
energy contained in any particle of matter is equal to the mass of that 
body multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. The relation 
between "e" and "mc2" is simple and fundamental to all mathematical 
problems, and it is established through the use of the equal sign or 
copula. Simply stated, within the equation, "e" is equaT to "mc2. 11 To 
know "mc 2" is to know "e" or energy. The formula becomes complex only 
when an attempt is made to determine the relation between "m" and 11 c 211 
and how it is to be applied to the physical universe. 
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Basically, the relation between "e" and "mc 211 is the same 
relation established above between "X" and "f" in the equation "X = f." 
But, once again, it is an ideal, abstract relation, that of identifi-
cation. 
In language, the relation between a representation and its 
attributes can be expressed through the use of the copula is. The 
copula is establishes the relation between a representation and its 
attributes, because a sentence can be an explicit statement of the 
relation between them. A representation is always expressed in a 
sentence as the subject of the sentence, and the attributes of the 
representation are the predicate complements of the subject. 
The relation that the copula in a sentence establishes is not, 
however, one of identification. It is only theoretically possible that 
it could be. It could be if and only if is means the same as the 
copula in a mathematical equation, that is, if the copula of a sentence 
means "equal to." But it should not when used to establish the 
relation between a representation and its attributes. 
The copula is can be used to mean "equal to," but to use it in 
this way distorts the relation between the representation and its 
attributes. True, representations are known by their attributes and 
only by their attributes, but, as demonstrated in Diagrams 1 through 7, 
that which can be known about a representation does not begin to 
account for all that is possible to know about it. Complete knowledge 
of a representation would be, were it possible, a complete system of 
all the attributes a representation has or could ever have. At best, 
a representation is always an incomplete system. 
The irrational nature of man's knowledge and the principle of 
disparity can be demonstrated as follows: 
R=a,a,a, •.• a 
1 2 3 n 
In this equation, "R" stands for a representation. The attributes by 
which "R" is known are represented by a system of lower case letter 
"a's" with subscripts. The equation denotes that "R" is constituted 
of an infinite number of attributes. The sign used to establish the 
relation between the representation and its attributes is the equal 
sign copula. But "R" is equal to its attributes only because there is 
potentially an infinite number of them. One less than an infinite 
number would make the use of the equal sign invalid. 
The relation between a representation and its attributes 
presented above with symbols can be demonstrated through the use of 
diagrams. Diagram 9 presents a model of any representation from the 
material world, the existence of which can be verified through the use 
of one or more of the five senses. It presents a model of a repre-
sentation before its attributes have been differentiated, that is, 
before they have been analyzed as having an existence independent of 
the representation. 
The small broken circles represent the attributes of a repre-
sentation before they have been differentiated. At this stage, the 
attributes are only potentially attributes. Each is identified as a 
potential attribute by the lower case letter "a" without a numerical 
subscript. 
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Potential 
Attributes 
Representation 
Representation ( "R") 
Before Differentiation 
Diagram 9 
A Representation Before its 
Attributes have been Differentiated 
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Thus far, though, the diagram seems to contradict the 
possibility of a representation having an infinite number of attributes, 
because the circle representing the model of a representation is 
finite in diameter and can contain only a finite number of potential 
attributes, whereas it should contain an infinite number of them. 
The contradiction is, however, only apparent and is created by 
the limitations imposed on the model. To fully account for all of 
the attributes a representation might possibly have, it is necessary 
to imagine the larger circle as infinitely expandable, so that it 
could include an infinite number of smaller circles representing 
potential attributes of the representation. Or the same thing can be 
accomplished by imagining a circle containing an infinite nu.mber of 
smaller circles, each of which would represent a potential attribute. 
Again, the small broken circles represent the potential 
attributes of a representation. To the extent to which the represen-
tation will be known, it will be known by those attributes. Those 
attributes will stand for the representation. 
There is only one way for the potential attributes of a 
representation to stand for the representation. They must be moved 
from their place within the large circle to the ring surrounding the 
large circle, as shown in Diagram 10. This movement is the process 
of differentiation, and can be accomplished only on the basis of the 
sense data received from the representation by the mind of man through 
one or more of his five senses. The senses discover the existence of 
attributes within a representation. The mind then differentiates 
between the sense data and the representation. 
Ring of Differentiated Attributes 
Diagram 10 
The Relation Between 
a Representation and its 
Differentiated Attributes 
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Diagram 10 represents the situation within which attributes 
are differentiated from a representation. The large ring in that 
diagram contains a number of small, broken circles comparable to 
those contained within the circle representing the representation. 
Whereas the small broken circles within the larger circle represent 
potential attributes of a representation, the small, broken circles in 
the large ring represents the potential for knowing the representation 
through its attributes, or its potential for differentiation. In both 
cases, the number or circles in or on each is potentially infinite. 
Each small, broken circle on the ring may become a differentiated 
attribute of the representation, so there must be as many of them as 
there are potential non-differentiated attributes. But, once again, 
the limitations of the model preclude the possibility of showing this. 
To be differentiated and become a known attribute of a 
representation in terms of the model, potential attributes must be 
moved from the circle standing for the representation to the ring 
surrounding that circle. When this occurs in terms of the model, the 
small, broken circles on the ring become small, complete circles as 
shown in Diagram 11 where one potential attribute has been differen-
tiated from the representation. At this point, the "a" standing for 
the differentiated attribute receives a numerical subscript, which, 
in this case, designates that it is the first and only potential 
attribute to be differentiated. The arrow in the diagram connecting 
potential attribute with the differentiated attribute simply denotes 
that the attribute has been differentiated. It stands for the copula. 
But, because man's knowledge is irrational and governed by 
the principle of disparity, the use of the arrow as a copula does not 
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Diagram 11 
Differentiated 
Attribute 
Relation Between a Representation 
and one Differentiated Attribute ("R > a 1") 
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mean that the representation and the one differentiated attribute are 
equal. At this point the relation between the representation and the 
attribute can be demonstrated symbolically as, 
The sign ) used as a copula establishes that "R" is "greater than" 
"a." It does not establish how much greater it is, but potentially 
it is infinitely greater. 
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The meaning of a representation is constructed of units of 
meaning contained in the basic symbolic expression, "R > a." These 
are the units of meaning mentioned in the discussion of the traditional 
definition of a sentence. A unit of meaning can be defined as a term 
denoting a representation joined to one attribute through the use of a 
copula meaning "greater than." In linguistic expressions of this 
relation, the relation between a term denoting a representation and an 
attribute is created by the copula "is." If it is to be used precisely, 
it can mean only "greater than," unless it is used abstractly to 
establish the possibility of the principle of identity. Only then can 
it mean "equal to." 
The only way to increase the meaning of "R" is to increase the 
number of units of meaning by which it can be known. Two units of 
meaning, "R > a1" and "R > a 2 ," can be joined together to form a 
compound unit of meaning: 
a , a 
1 2 
Two or more units of meaning can be added to one another in this manner 
until the number of attributes by which "R" is known is infinite: 
a,a,a, .•• a 
1 2 3 n 
Each unit of meaning is, in effect, a molecule of meaning that can be 
added to other molecules of meaning to create larger and larger 
molecules of meaning, approximately, but never equalling a complete 
thing or representation. Diagram 12 shows the above process carried 
to the point of 
R) a , 
1 
a , 
2 
a , 
3 
a , 
4 
a , a , a , 
5 6 7 
a , 
8 
a,a ,a ,a 
9 10 11 12 
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Diagram 12 
Representation with 12 
Differentiated Attributes 
45 
CHAPTER III 
SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The possibility of systematic knowledge--unity within an 
infinite variety of representations--depends on man's noting 
similarities among representations. The similarity of two or more 
representations is determined by the attributes of the representations: 
if two or more representations have one or more of the same attributes, 
then they are similar and belong to a system of knowledge. 
Classification 
The only systems that exist are those that classify. Mathe-
matics and logic are systems of knowledge, but they are systems that 
abstract from the systems that classify that which is the essential 
structure of all systems. They are studies that attempt to abstract 
all that all systems have in common with one another. 
Biological Classification 
In no other field of- human endeavor has the process of 
developing systems been more fully developed than in science, 
especially in the biological sciences. Biology would be meaningless 
without a system for classifying animals and plants. Over a million 
different species of animals and over 350,000 different species of 
plants have been identified and classified. Each specie is classified 
within a system containing seven basic levels: Kingdom, Phylum or 
Division, Class, Order, Family, Genus and Species. 7 
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An animal or plant is a member of one or more of these levels 
according to specific, physical features. The hierarchy of which the 
system consists is designed to provide specific kinds of information. 
Its formation is governed by a principle or controlling idea. Early 
systems of biological classification were governed simply by a 
principle based on the purely specific, physical features of animals 
and plants. They were classified according to their form and structure. 
Only those features that could be observed, the obvious and the 
physical, were used. Each class of plants and animals was constructed 
on the basis of large numbers of empirically associated features. 8 
Early systems were similar to the system a gardener might use 
in planning his garden. Flowers can be classified according to how 
tall they grow, or according to their color. A gardener would like to 
know how tall flowers grow in order to know which flowers to put in 
the front of his garden and which to put in the back. He might also 
want to vary the colors of the flowers at various points within his 
garden. The principle governing his planting is similar to that used 
by biologists in earlier systems. The demands, however, of biologists 
have evolved far beyond those satisfied by the earlier system. 
The modern system of classifying animals and plants is based 
on the principle of phylogeny, that is, according to the evolutionary 
development of an animal or plant. The physical features of animals 
and plants provide the criteria for assigning a plant or animal to a 
class. The hierarchy, the position of a plant or animal within it, is 
designed to establish the position of a plant or animal within the 
scale of evolution. The system automatically encodes this information. 
As such, it provides the morphologist with morphological information, 
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the physiologist with physiological information, and the ecologist with 
ecological information. 9 
Outside the realm of the physical sciences, though, little has 
been done formally to establish systems. Systems are not the sole 
concern of the scientist, but they do tend to be neglected in all but 
the most formal of disciplines. Writing, for instance, is funda-
mentally the process of creating systems, but little exists in the 
literature on writing on how a system is created with writing. Few 
writers are probably actually aware of how extensively they draw on 
the theory of systems when they write. 
Informal Classification 
Even less often is the "average" man aware of this. Seldom is 
he aware that he classifies just about everything with which he comes 
into contact. He does it, though, and for the most part, without the 
benefit of knowing how it is he does it or can do it. So many of his 
systems are invalid. Many of them oversimplify the nature of his 
experience and lead him into believing things for which there is no 
basis. 
That so much of human thought is devoted to creating systems 
becomes evident when questions of the following type are answered: 
1. "What gives you the most pleasure?" 
2. "What do you like to eat?" 
3. "Where would you like to spend your vacation?" 
4. "What subjects in school do you like the best?" 
To answer any one of these questions would immediately force an 
individual into classification. Each question stipulates a class or 
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classes from which the individual would have to make a selection. To 
make a selection, the individual would have to first consider each and 
every member of each class stipulated by the question. Then, according 
to his predilection or some controlling idea, he would select the one 
most suited to him. 
Before responding to the first question, he would have to 
consider as many things as there are that give him ~leasure. From 
those things which give him .pleasure, he would then select the one 
thing that gives him the most pleasure. In responding to the second 
question, from the class of things he eats, he would have to select 
the things he likes to eat. The things he likes to eat would then be 
a class. From the class of places where he might spend his vacation, 
he would have to select the place where he would most like to spend it. 
From the class of subject he takes at school as stipulated in question 
four, he must select the ones he likes most according to his 
predilection. He may like only one subject or none, but he must 
still respond to the question from within a class. 
No other form of communication quite throws an individual back 
on his dependence on systems more than does the question. It is, 
perhaps, for this reason that questions are so taxing. 
A class becomes a sort of concept that allows learning and the 
application of that learning. Classes collect the distillate of man's 
experiences into concepts upon which he may call in the future. He 
learns the attributes of things by experiencing them. He may, for 
instance, experience a tree. He may have only one confrontation with 
a tree, but the distillate from that experience is enough to create a 
class upon which he may call in the future in any confrontation with 
any other three. 
A man confronted with a tree abstracts from it its critical 
attributes. Those critical attributes constitute the distillate of 
his experience. Repeated confrontations with members of the class of 
representations called "trees" creates a stronger and stronger 
distillate. Infrequent confrontations tend to dissipate it. ·· · A man 
may even lose all the distillate from his confrontation and not be 
able to identify a tree after a lapse of time. Or he may be able to 
identify a tree from the distillate of previous experiences, but fail 
to remember the name by which that representation is known. 
Determining Class Membership 
50 
To differentiate the attributes of a representation from the 
representation as demonstrated previously is to define the represen-
tation. To define it is to discover the class or classes to which it 
belongs. Establishing a representation's membership in a class or 
classes automatically places it within a system. The process by which 
a representation becomes a member of a class is the prototype for the 
process necessary for anything material or non-material to become a 
part of a system. Every experience man has, therefore, must be treated 
as if it were no more nor less than a representation. As a result, the 
basic unit of all meaning, the relation between "R" and an "a" as 
expressed in the equation "R) a," is the basic unit of meaning for 
all of man's experiences, whether of material or non-material represen-
tations. 
An intellect that does not differentiate between one represen-
tation and another, and that does not acknowledge the difference 
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between a representation and its attributes, passively accepts a 
disorderly and undifferentiated universe. An individual totally 
passive to his experiences would drive through a neighborhood and not 
even be aware of any of the houses. He might not even be aware that he 
was in one neighborhood as opposed to another. He would not be in 
contact with "reality." 
Every individual is confronted with a multitude of represen-
tations of all kinds every waking moment. The mind, however, has the 
power to differentiate only a small part of all that it is confronted 
with, so differentiation is selective. If, for example, a man were 
driving through a neighborhood, he might differentiate between one 
house and another on the basis of the house numbers. Another man might 
differentiate the same neighborhood on the basis of the way each house 
is landscaped. Another might do it on the basis of the kinds of 
automobiles in front of each house. An individual totally committed to 
differentiation might try to differentiate between one house and 
another, using as many different standards as he was intellectually 
equipped to use. But, even then, he would not be able to totally 
differentiate the neighborhood, simply because there are so many other 
ways he might do it, ways for which he is not intellectually equipped. 
To attempt to do it with as many different standards as he was intel-
lectually equipped to use would be intellectually exhausting. Differen-
tiation must, therefore, be selective. 
But the closer an individual comes to totally differentiating 
his universe the more sophisticated will be his intellectual life. A 
totally undifferentiated universe would reflect a total lack of intel-
lectual life. The reason for this is that differentiation is contingent 
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upon a pragmatic need that can be satisfied only by a differentiated 
universe. The degree of the intensity of the need regulates the drive 
to differentiate. The absence of differentiation in the intellectual 
life of an individual suggests the absence of any intense psychological 
or intellectual need. 
Differentiation 
Analysis begins with perceiving that the attributes of a 
representation can have a status of their own, separate and independent 
of the representation. Rather than emphasizing the dependence of the 
attributes on the representation, we should emphasize the dependence of 
the representation on its attributes. 
Nothing can be stated about a representation until its attributes 
have been differentiated, except that it "exists." Its "existence" is 
no more than a basic awareness of its presence and provides no knowledge 
of it, except passive knowledge. Only out of an awareness of the 
"existence" of a relation between a representation and its attributes--
an active confrontation with the representation--does the represen-
tation take on meaning. When a representation is itself, it remains in 
a pre-analytic, undifferentiated state of being. When it is something 
else, it has been differentiated and becomes an object of knowledge. 
It is something else only when its attributes have an existence 
independent o! it, so its attributes become the condition for its 
existence. 
To determine a representatibn's ' membership in a class, as many 
of its attributes as possible should be differentiated. Then, depending 
upon the controlling idea under which the system is being created, those 
attributes that seem to most adequately define the representation are 
selected out of all that have been differentiated. Those attributes 
will be the basis of the process of classification. 
Constructing a System 
To the extent that man can construct systems, he can through 
the use of units of meaning. The prototype for the structure of that 
mechanism is the representation, that is, the relation between a 
representation and its attributes. In mathematics, that relation is 
expressed in an equation as the relation between the unknown "X" 
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factor for which the mathematician solves, and the solution to the 
equation, that by which the "X" factor will be known. In writing, the 
act of creating systems through the use of language, the relation 
between the representation and its attributes is expressed through the 
use of a sentence, defined as a subject, a copula and one predicate 
complement. In all three cases, the basic unit of thought consists of 
an unknown, a copula, and that which is known, as shown in the diagram 
below: 
Unit of Thought Unknown Copula Known 
Representation Representation ~ 10 Attributes 
Equation "X" = Solution 
Sentence Subject is Predicate 
Complement 
Since the relation between a representation and its attributes is the 
prototype of the unit of thought, it is possible to demonstrate the way 
in which systems of knowledge are constructed in terms of a represen-
tation, such that all that is stated about representations is applicable 
to the function of the other units of thought in constructing systems. 
Classes Defined by Attributes 
As has already been demonstrated, a representation stands in 
the following relation to its attributes: 
R =a, a, a , .•. a 
1 2 3 n 
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The meaning of "R" is composed of units of meaning, that is, from units 
composed of "R" and "a" expressed as "R > a." To fully express "R," 
an infinite number of units must be combined through some sort of 
process of conjunction. But one unit of meaning is sufficient to give 
some meaning to "R," just as one unit is sufficient to place it within 
a system. 
Diagram 13 is the same basic diagram used in demonstrating the 
relation between "R" and "a." But the act of differentiation--to move 
potential attribute of a representation from the circle that represents 
it to the ring surrounding it--creates an intellectual effect far 
greater than simply establishing the independence of the attribute. 
The new significance of the act is demonstrated in Diagram 14, which 
shows an enlargement of the differentiated attribute surrounded by the 
open circle with the arrows in Diagram 13. 
The differentiated attribute shown in Diagram 14, has a 
characteristic it did not have formerly. The circle that represents 
it is filled with many smaller, broken circles which stand for the 
members of a class. The circle that formerly stood for the attribute 
of a representation no longer does so. It stands for the class to 
which the representation belongs by virtue of its having an attribute 
common to all the other members of that class. Attribute "a "as 
1' 
shown in Diagram 14, is no longer a separate, distinct entity by which 
the representation is known. 
Diagram 13 
Attribute 11 a
1
11 to be Enlarged 
in Diagram 14 
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Representation ("R") 
Ring of Differentiated 
Attributes 
Diagram 14 
Enlargement of Diagram 13 
(4x) to Show Relation 
Between a Representation 
and its Class Membership 
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A representation is not, then, known by its attributes, but by 
its membership in a class or classes to which it belongs by virtue of 
its having the attribute required for class membership. But it can 
also be a member of an infinite number of other classes. Just as a 
representation has infinite number of potential attributes that can be 
differentiated, it can belong to a potentially infinite number of 
classes, one class for each potential attribute. 
Th~ ring surrounding the representation in the diagram does 
not, then, present only the potential for the differentiation of the 
representation. It presents the potential for the class membership of 
a representation, so there must be potentially an infinite number of 
circles on that ring. The only thing preventing it in the diagram is 
the natural limitations of the model; that is, it is finite. 
But the number of classes to which a representation may belong 
is infinite, even if the number of its known attributes were only 
finite. The irrational nature of human thought and the principle of 
disparity demands this to provide classes to which no known represen-
tation may belong. Classes without members create the realm of possi-
bility. There may, for instance, be a class of representations with 
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the attribute of "brillig," although no one has ever experienced such a 
representation. Any representation with that attribute must belong to 
that class, even though that representation has never been nor ever will 
be experienced by man. 
The meaning of the copula used to establish the relation 
between a representation and its attributes has, therefore, a meaning 
different from the one formerly ascribed to it. The symbol ) now 
means "greater than" the membership of a representation in less than an 
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infinite number of classes. In terms of symbols, "R) a" means that 
"R" is greater than its membership in class "a." It is greater than 
its membership in class "a a, a, etc." up to and including infinity. 
1' 2 3 
Binary Function 
A representation either has or does not have a specific 
attribute, and either is or is not a member of a class, depending upon 
whether or not it has the specific attribute necessary for membership 
in that class. There are no halfway measures for determining whether 
or not a representation has a specific attribute, or for determining 
whether or not it is a member of a class. 
This reveals a basic mechanism of the mind needed to construct 
systems. The mind is binary, or two-phased. All units of thought are 
either affirmed or negated; they are either true or false, right or 
wrong. There are no other possibilities, and from this basically 
simple mechanism all that is complicated and complex in man's intel-
lectual life is developed. 
A representation either has or does not have a specific 
attribute. The problem is determining which attributes a represen-
tation actually has. Determining the attributes of a material represen-
tation is, however, slightly less of a problem than determining the 
attributes of a non-material representation. The attributes of 
material things are empirically demonstrable. That is, a material 
thing either has an attribute or it does not, depending upon whether or 
not its attribute can be confirmed through the use of one or more of the 
five senses. If the means of confirming such an attribute are well 
established, then the problem is greatly diminished. 
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In biology, for instance, an animal either is or is not a 
member of the class "species" depending upon whether or not it can 
interbreed with other members of that class. Varieties of house cats 
belong to that class because they can interbreed. So, in order to 
belong to that class, an animal must be able to interbreed with other 
members of that class. If they cannot, then they are not members. The 
basic process is as simple as that. The only difficulty would arise 
if there were problems in determining if a particular animal could or 
could not interbreed with other members of the class. Though unlikely, 
it is possible. 
If someone were confronted with a large number of representations 
to be grouped into some sort of order, then the differences between the 
attributes of the various representations would be ignored; only the 
similarities would be noted. A teacher, for example, might be looki ng 
for a way to group students and decide to do it according to how many 
have a specific, verifiable grade point average. Whatever other 
differences exist between the students would be ignored. A student 
either has it or does not! The reason the teacher had for wanting to 
group the students would be the controlling idea for the construction 
of his system. 
A representation, then, either has a particular attribute or it 
does not. If it has a particular attribute, it is a member o·f a· class 
of other representations having the same attributes. Its membership 
in that class is automatic and unquestioned. Its membership is 
automatic because of the structure of thought, and its membership is 
unquestioned because it must have been determined that it has the 
particular attribute that automatically places it within a class. No 
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room for qualification exists, therefore, in determining the membership 
of a representation in a class. 
But qualified responses do exist in human communication. This 
" 
does not, however, negate the fact that all basic units of thought are 
unqualified. It simply demonstrates the wide range of complicated and 
complex thought patterns possible through the use of a simply binary 
mechanism. 
Qualified units of thought are created by the juxtaposition of 
two or more units of thought through the use of "but" or some linguistic 
equivalent. This word is the basic sign of qualification, and is a 
major component of such phrases as "yes, but •••. " or "no, but •.•. " 
"But" creates a qualified unit of thought within a system by 
qualifying an unqualified unit of thought with another unqualified unit 
of thought. If, for instance, "R > al, but R > a2, II the unit of 
thought in "R) a II is qualified by "R) a II This statement suggests . 
1 2 
that "R > a II and "R ') 1 a II 2 are contradictory, at least in part, or 
that they are partly mutually exclusive. In other words, the statement 
maintains that "R" cannot have both the attribute "a" and "a" and 
1 2 
belong to the two different classes in which these attributes gain it 
membership. 
This may occur for one of two reasons. It may be that "a " or 
1 
"a" or both is not an attribute of "R." If this is the case, the two 
2 
units of thought cannot qualify each other because one or the other or 
both are false, that is, invalid units of thought. They cannot be 
contradictory nor mutually exclusive in any of these cases, because no 
valid system can be created from invalid units of thought. 
The other way in which this can occur is to assert that a 
representation's membership in one class automatically precludes its 
membership in another or any other class. In this first case, the 
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only way a representation can be precluded membership in a class is for 
it not to have an attribute which entitles it to membership in that 
class. If it has an attribute which entitles it to membership in a 
class, then it is a member of that class no matter what other classes it 
belongs to. Its membership in one class can never automatically 
preclude its membership in another. The only way to preclude its 
membership from a class is to assert and establish that it does not 
have the attribute necessary for membership. 
Sub-Classes 
It has already been established that a representation can have 
two or more--infinitely more--attributes. To assert, then, that 
"R ) a
1
, 11 but that also 11 R > a
2 
11 does not contradict this possibility. 
What actually occurs is that "R" becomes a member of a sub-class known 
as f a
1
, a
2
J, as shown in Diagram 15. In this diagram, the same basic 
diagram as Diagram 14, another ring has been added to the one already 
existing. The small, broken circles on this ring stand for the sub-
classes to which a representation may potentially belong. The two 
classes represented by the two complete, small circles on the inner, 
designated as 11 a" and "a II are connected to one of the small circles on 
1 2 
the outer ring. Whereas, all of the other circles on the outer ring are 
broken, the one designated as [a
1
, a
2
} is complete. It is complete 
because its potential for becoming a class with members (at least one) 
11 a 2
11 with (a1 , a 2} 
has been actualized. The lines connecting "a II 
1 
and 
signifies that process has been completed. 
I 
I 
Representation {"R") 
a 
-1 
I 
I 
I 
Diagram 15 
Representation~s Membership 
in Sub-class {a
1
, a
2
J 
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Rings of Differ-
entiation. 
If, for instance, "R" stands for a house cat, it is a member 
of the class 11 a
1
11 that can interbreed. Its ability to interbreed is a 
differentiated attribute that entitles the representation, house cat, 
membership in class 11 a
1
• 11 The same cat may have a short tail, as 
distinguished from other cats that are members of "a" that may have 
1 
medium or long tails. For this reason, any house cat may be a member 
of "a1 ," but it is also a member of "a2 ." Its membership in one does 
not contradict its membership in the other. A contradiction would 
be possible only if a particular house cat did not interbreed and did 
not have a short tail. Because the house cat in question interbreeds 
and has a short tail, it belongs to sub-class fa
1
, a 2)· 
Possible Classes 
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The binary system of affirmation and negation also holds true 
for determining possibilities of class membership. In the example 
above, there may be no known examples of short-tailed cats that do not 
or cannot interbreed. But, since the possibility that the equal and 
opposite of any class exists, it must be possible, though perhaps not 
probable, that such a cat exists. The possibility of the existence of 
such a class must either be affirmed or negated. The very constitution 
of the mind, however, demands that that possibility be affirmed, 
although man's experience of the animal world can contribute nothing but 
negation. This is one of the reasons man's mind can function inde-
pendent of the sense data he receives from representations. 
It is also possible through the use of the binary system to 
affirm or negate the possibility of the existence of a class for which 
there are no members, as, for example, the class of representations with 
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the attribute "brillig" mentioned before. The structure of human 
thought is such that a class of "brilligs" may exist. Whether or not 
its existence is to be affirmed or negated is dependent upon man's 
experience. If he has never experienced any representation with a 
"brillig" attribute, he will negate the class. He must, however, no 
matter what his experience has been or will be, affirm the possibility 
that one exists, unless he treats possibility agnostically, that is, as 
a null state of mind. 
A material representation, as mentioned earlier, is the proto-
type of all representations, because of the relations between a material 
representation and its attributes. That same relation is basic to all 
knowledge, for knowledge is the knowledge of a representation, material 
or non-material. The materiality of a representation does not· in' ci.hy· · 
way lessen or increase the relevance of the basic relation to man's 
understanding. 
The basic unit of all thought--an unknown, a copula and a 
known--is derived from the relation between a representation and its 
attributes. Because its application to thought is so essential and 
universal, it can be thought of as a vehicle for conveying meaning, and 
meaning is knowledge. It matters not what meaning the vehicle conveys. 
It bears the full weight of human understanding regardless of the 
materiality of the meaning. It can bear garbage as well as it can 
bear pure gold. 
Because it is so universal and immanent in all thought, it is 
possible to study non-material representations and arrive at the same 
conclusions derived from the study of material representations, but the 
difficulties are extreme. The basic unit of thought can be too easily 
misused, even when dealing with material representations. It is only 
too easy to assign to a material representation attributes it does not 
have. When used to convey information about non-material represen-
tations, its misuse invariably distorts the relation between the 
representation and its attributes. 
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An idea, for instance, is a representation, and could be 
analyzed in the same way as a material representation can be analyzed, 
as Plato and many other philosophers have attempted to do. But the 
relation between an idea and its attributes is never certain, because 
there is no way to demonstrate that a specific representation has any 
specific attributes. The attributes of a material representation either 
can or cannot be demonstrated through the use of one or more of the 
five senses. If they can; then they constitute the representation. If 
they cannot, then they do not. It is as simple as that. 
Detennining whether or not a specific non-material represen-
tation such as an idea has an attribute, a specific attribute or any 
attributes, is a different matter. There are simply no guidelines for 
determining whether or not a representation of this sort even has 
attributes. The regulative function of the mind's program, working 
with the distillate of experience, can create systems that have all the 
characteristics of knowledge, but none of the content of knowledge. 
Systems can be constituted of non-existent as well as extstent represen-
tations, and make "sense." 
A system can be created simply by affirming or negating that a 
non-material representation has or has not a particular attribute. The 
representation is an unknown that will become known only when its 
attributes are known. A copula will establish the relation between the 
unknown and the known. The idea of justice, for instance, is an 
unknown which can become known, or a known which can always become 
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better known. To the extent that justice will be known, it will be 
known as the total of all the attributes of which it is constituted. To 
become known, it must be known through the formula R= a, a , a ... , a . 
1 2 3 n 
Knowledge of it will be constituted of units of thought, that is, 
"R) a." 
To become "R) a
1
, 11 justice must possess the attribute "a
1
" and 
will possess it only by affirming that it is demonstrably an attribute 
of "R" or justice. It either is or is not. If it is not, then justice 
may be defined as Ila II 
1 
or not II The meaning of justice will be 
built up of such units, though the ultimate meaning is unknowable. In 
defining justice, "a" might be "equity." 
1 
"a" might be "fairness," 
2 
and "a" might be 
3 
"law." If it is, then "justice is equity, fairness 
and law" would be a definition. The problem is, though, that justice is 
not really defined by these attributes. The meaning of each is 
contingent upon other definitions. 
The problem arises because it is impossible to establish that 
the attributes above belong to justice. None of the five senses can be 
used to establish them. One man can assert that they are the attributes 
of justice, but another might just as easily and with just as much good 
reason assert that justice is not "equity," "fairness" or "law." He 
might just as easily assert that justice is a "lie," a "farce," a 
"black eye," or even something totally nonsensical, such as "justice is 
a barrel of cold pickles." This last definition satisfies the 
requirement for an unknown that will become known when its attribute or 
attributes are known. In this case, the "R" is "justice,'' and 
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attribute "a" is "a barrel of cold pickles." It is the only attribute 
1 
at this point by which "R," justice, can be known. 
The absurd is not, however, necessary to discover and under-
stand the basic problem. The only criteria available for determining 
the validity of a differentiated, non-material representation are 
negative. There are no positive guidelines like the ones for deter-
mining the validity of a differentiated, material representation. All 
systems--whether of material or non-material representations--are 
invariably incomplete and conditional, but differentiated non-material 
representations fail to mee_t two major criteria for any system: first, 
any part or attribute of a non-material representation can be removed 
from the system that constitutes the representation without changing 
or distorting the whole representation. Second, many other parts or 
attributes can be added to it without distorting it. 
In the first case, the constitution of a non-material represen-
tation is such that its existence is not necessarily contingent upon its 
having one attribute as opposed to another. For one person, such a 
representation may be constituted of one or more attributes, whereas, 
for another person, it may be constituted of attributes completely 
contradictory to those held advocated by another. One is as right or 
wrong as another, for all intents and purposes, because neither can be 
proven right or wrong. When confronted with a material representation, 
two people may disagree over the constitution of that representation, 
but their disagreement can always be resolved by simply experiencing it. 
One or the other of them must be right and the other wrong, unless both 
of them are wrong. One or the other is right and the other wrong if and 
only if one or the other has properly defined the attributes of the 
representation. Both may have improperly defined them. 
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Because the attributes of a non-material representation can 
neither be affirmed nor negated, experienced to be or not to be an 
attribute of a representation, they have been and are and will continue 
to be subject to endless dispute. If the existence of a representation 
is dependent upon its attributes, and its attributes cannot be verified, 
the representation may or may not exist. And if its exists, there is 
no guarantee that there will be any significant universal agreement on 
its meaning. Although arguments about the constitution of non-material 
representations is the basis of most philosophical inquiry, to argue 
about them as existent or non-existent is epistemologically invalid, 
and to argue about them as if they were one or the other is the source 
of never-ending frustration. 
But non-material representations cannot be avoided in any 
argument of any consequence. They are important to the intellectual 
life of man because they operate as man's intellectual probes into the 
unknown, into the universe of possibilities. It is a universe rich 
with intellectual satisfaction, and a universe much more satisfying in 
many ways than the one in which all either is or is not verifiable. 
Knowledge itself, therefore, constitutes a never-ending dilemma. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lJoseph Frank, The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern 
Literature (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957, p. 8. 
(Originally published in The Sewannee Review: "Spatial Form in 
Modern Literature," Vol. LIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1945), No. 3 
(Summer, 1945), No. 4 (Autumn, 1945). I am indebted to Dr. Bruce 
Teets of my committee for pointing out the relevance of this 
essay to my thesis. 
2rbid., p. 10. 
3rbid. 
4Richard M. Weaver, Rhetoric and Composition (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p.164. 
5rbid. 
6r am indebted to Dr. Donald Cummings of my committee for this 
distinction. I was prepared to use the term "transcendental" 
rather than "irrational" to designate this kind of knowledge, 
which would not have adequately described the intellectual 
phenomenon involved here. 
7william T. Keeton, Biological Science (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1967), p. 704. 
8rbid. 
9rbid., p. 705. 
lOThis sign means "equal to or greater than." The attribute(s) of 
a representation can be "equal to" the representation only when the 
relation is that of identification. In all other cases, the 
representation is "greater than" its attribute(s). 
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